In Search of Limiting Principles: The Eleventh Circuit Invalidates the Individual Mandate in \u3cem\u3eFlorida v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services\u3c/em\u3e by Thide, Frederick
Boston College Law Review
Volume 53 | Issue 1 Article 9
1-1-2012
In Search of Limiting Principles: The Eleventh
Circuit Invalidates the Individual Mandate in




Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please
contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Frederick Thide, In Search of Limiting Principles: The Eleventh Circuit Invalidates the Individual Mandate in Florida v. U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, 53 B.C.L. Rev. 359 (2012), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol53/iss1/9
IN SEARCH OF LIMITING PRINCIPLES: THE 
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT INVALIDATES THE 
INDIVIDUAL MANDATE IN FLORIDA v. U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND  
HUMAN SERVICES 
Abstract: On August 12, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit held in Florida v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services that 
Congress exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause and Necessary 
and Proper Clause by requiring individuals to purchase health insurance 
as part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. In reaching its 
holding, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the Government’s argument that 
the individual mandate is a necessary and proper means for implement-
ing its larger regulation of health insurance markets. Yet, this Comment 
argues that the Eleventh Circuit’s exacting review of Congress’s findings 
and underlying policy judgments, if adopted by the Supreme Court, may 
significantly constrain Congress’s power to craft a novel solution to a 
complex regulatory challenge. 
Introduction 
 On March 23, 2010, following nearly a year of debate in Congress 
and decades of political wrangling over proposals for universal health 
care, President Obama signed into law the Patient Protection and Af-
fordable Care Act (“Affordable Care Act” or “Act”).1 The Act seeks to 
achieve universal access to health care by increasing eligibility for gov-
ernment programs and expanding access to private health insurance 
markets.2 To encourage near-universal coverage, the Act—with limited 
exceptions—requires citizens to maintain insurance and insurers to ac-
cept all enrollees.3 The battle over this unprecedented federal regula-
tion of health care and health insurance markets immediately shifted to 
                                                                                                                      
1 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010), amended by Healthcare and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010); see Robert Pear & David M. Herszenhorn, Obama Hails Vote on 
Health Care as Answering “The Call of History,” N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 2010, at A1. 
2 See Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility After the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1577, 1580–93 (2011). 
3 See 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A (West 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2014); 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-1 
(West 2003 & Supp. 2011). 
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the courts.4 States and individuals throughout the nation brought facial 
challenges to the Affordable Care Act, claiming that, among other 
things, the Act’s individual mandate is an impermissible exercise of leg-
islative power under the Commerce Clause5 as enhanced by the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause.6 
 The Act is Congress’s solution to a complex market failure.7 In 
2008, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that forty-five million 
Americans were uninsured and projected that conditions would con-
tinue to deteriorate.8 Consequently, in its legislative findings, Congress 
reasoned that ethical and legal obligations to provide emergency 
health care to uninsured result in the uncompensated consumption of 
health care services.9 Indeed, Congress found that, in 2009, forty-three 
billion dollars in uncompensated health care costs were shifted to other 
payers, translating to an average increase of one thousand dollars in 
premiums for a family health plan.10 Meanwhile, health care costs have 
grown to nearly eighteen percent of gross domestic product.11 
 Part I of this Comment reviews Congress’s efforts to expand access 
to health insurance markets.12 Part I then briefly describes the diver-
gent outcomes in two courts of appeals concerning the constitutionality 
of the individual mandate as a necessary and proper means for carry-
ing into execution Congress’s larger regulation of health insurance 
markets.13 Part II surveys U.S. Supreme Court decisions interpreting 
the reach of the Necessary and Proper Clause.14 It then examines the 
2011 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in 
Florida v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, including the 
                                                                                                                      
4 Warren Richey, Attorneys General in 14 States Sue to Block Healthcare Reform Law, Chris-
tian Science Monitor (Mar. 23, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2010/ 
0323/Attorneys-general-in-14-states-sue-to-block-healthcare-reform-law. 
5 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
6 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see, e.g., Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 
1235, 1240–41 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3297 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2011) (No. 
11-398); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 533–34 (6th Cir. 2011), petition for 
cert. filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3065 (U.S. July 26, 2011) (No. 11-117). 
7 See generally Sherry A. Glied, Health Insurance and Market Failure Since Arrow, 26 J. 
Health Pol. Pol’y & L. 957 (2001) (describing market failures in health insurance mar-
kets). 
8 Cong. Budget Office, Key Issues in Analyzing Major Health Insurance Pro-
posals 1 (2008). 
9 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091 (West Supp. 2011). 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 See infra notes 17–31 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 32–43 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 44–59 and accompanying text. 
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court’s refusal to uphold the individual mandate as an essential com-
ponent of Congress’s larger regulatory scheme.15 Finally, Part III argues 
that the Eleventh Circuit’s reexamination of the factual basis for the 
individual mandate departs from rational basis review, thereby under-
mining Congress’s power to set social welfare policy.16 
I. The Affordable Care Act: A Comprehensive Solution to  
a Complex Market Failure 
A. Congress’s Comprehensive Regulatory Solution 
 The Affordable Care Act spans thousands of pages and enacts a 
comprehensive scheme to reform health care and health insurance 
markets.17 The Act relies on several interdependent mechanisms to 
promote universal access to health care and to control rising health 
care costs.18 First, the Act provides tax incentives to encourage small 
employers to purchase health insurance for their employees and re-
quires that large employers provide coverage.19 Second, the Act estab-
lishes state-run marketplaces for health plans called Exchanges to allow 
individuals and small groups to leverage their collective buying power.20 
Third, the Act expands eligibility for Medicaid to provide uniform gov-
ernment-sponsored health care coverage to the poor.21 
 Additionally, the Act seeks to foster access to private health insur-
ance markets by banning certain insurance industry practices designed 
to minimize insurance risk.22 For example, the Act proscribes denying 
coverage for pre-existing conditions.23 Congress eliminated these prac-
tices by imposing two requirements on insurers.24 First, the Act’s guar-
anteed issue provision requires health plans to accept all enrollees re-
                                                                                                                      
15 See infra notes 60–74 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 75–89 and accompanying text. 
17 See Baker, supra note 2, at 1580–93. 
18 See id. 
19 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 45R, 4980H (West 2011). 
20 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031 (West Supp. 2011). 
21 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (West 2003 & Supp. 2011) (expanding 
Medicaid eligibility to individuals with family incomes below 133% of the federal poverty 
level); see also Sara Rosenbaum, Realigning the Social Order: The Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act and the U.S. Health Insurance System, 7 J. Health & Biomedical L. 1, 16–17 (2011) 
(noting that this reform “closes Medicaid’s last remaining coverage gap for the poor”). 
22 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)( J) (West Supp. 2011). 
23 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-3 (West 2003 & Supp. 2011). 
24 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Florida, 648 F.3d 1235 (No. 11-398), 2011 WL 
5025286, at *2–4. 
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gardless of age, gender, or health status.25 Second, the community rat-
ing requirement prohibits insurers from charging higher premiums to 
individuals based on such factors as claims experience, medical history, 
or genetic information.26 Collectively, these reforms are designed to 
expand access to health care coverage and to reduce the cost-shifting 
externality caused by the uncompensated consumption of health care 
services.27 
 To compensate for the inclusion of riskier enrollees and to elimi-
nate incentives for individuals to forgo purchasing health insurance un-
til they need care, Congress imposed an individual mandate, requiring 
“applicable individual[s]” to obtain “minimum essential coverage” or 
pay a penalty.28 The individual mandate works in tandem with the guar-
anteed issue and community rating reforms to expand coverage while 
                                                                                                                      
25 See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300gg-1(a), 300gg-3, 300gg-4(a). 
26 Id. § 300gg(a)(1). In a community-rated market, insurers charge all individuals cov-
ered under a specific plan the same premium without regard to gender, health status, or 
other factors. See Mark V. Pauly, The Welfare Economics of Community Rating, 37 J. Risk & Ins. 
407, 407–08 (1970). Premiums are based on the risk factors of the entire population cov-
ered by the plan, rather than those of any single individual. Id. Consequently, the cost of 
covering higher-risk individuals (e.g., the elderly and chronically ill) is subsidized by lower-
risk individuals (e.g., the young). See Roger L. Pupp, Community Rating and Cross Subsidies in 
Health Insurance, 48 J. Risk & Ins. 610, 610–11 (1981). The Act implements a system of 
adjusted community rating whereby an insurer may, within limits, vary the community rate 
based on age, tobacco use, and geography. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg(a)(1). 
27 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091. Indeed, the Government argued that it is “‘proper’ for 
Congress to take into account the societal judgment—reflected in state and federal law—
that denying emergency care because the patient lacks insurance would be unconscion-
able.” Brief for the United States at 36, Florida, 648 F.3d 1235 (Nos. 11-11021 & 11-11067). 
But see Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey H. Kahn, Commentary, Free Rider: A Justification for Man-
datory Medical Insurance Under Health Care Reform?, 109 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 78, 
80–81 (2011), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/109/kahn.pdf (challenging 
the view that the healthy cause an externality by not subsidizing the medical expenses of 
the unhealthy). 
28 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A (West 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2014). Congress found that, with-
out a minimum coverage provision, the guaranteed issue and community rating require-
ments would increase incentives for individuals to “wait to purchase health insurance until 
they needed care,” leading to adverse selection. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(I). Adverse 
selection occurs when a pool of enrollees becomes increasingly high risk because individu-
als enroll only when they require medical care. See Peter Seigelman, Adverse Selection in 
Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113 Yale L.J. 1223, 1223 & n.1, 1224 (2004). The 
resulting premium increases lead to the flight of healthier policyholders to cheaper plans 
or to the ranks of the uninsured. See id. at 1223–24 & n.1. This process, called an “adverse 
selection death spiral,” continues until the health plan collapses under the weight of its 
high-risk and high-cost population. See Thomas Buchmueller & John DiNardo, Did Com-
munity Rating Induce an Adverse Selection Death Spiral? Evidence from New York, Pennsylvania, 
and Connecticut, 92 Am. Econ. Rev. 280, 280 (2002). 
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broadening the risk pool, and thereby promotes economies of scale.29 
Indeed, Congress found that an individual mandate, together with its 
other insurance industry reforms, would expand access to private health 
insurance markets, resulting in a more efficient allocation of risk and 
lower premiums.30 Thus, Congress concluded that the individual man-
date was essential to its larger regulation of health insurance markets.31 
B. The Affordable Care Act and the Circuit Split 
 On June 29, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
issued its opinion in St. Thomas More Law Center v. Obama affirming the 
district court’s finding that the individual mandate is essential to Con-
gress’s larger regulation of health care and health insurance markets.32 
Shortly thereafter and in contrast to the Sixth Circuit, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held in Florida v. U.S. Department of 
Health & Human Services that the individual mandate exceeded constitu-
tionally imposed boundaries on the commerce power.33 Among other 
things, the courts disagreed over whether it is appropriate for Congress 
to compel individuals to purchase health insurance to maintain the in-
tegrity of the Affordable Care Act’s comprehensive regulatory scheme.34 
 The court in Florida identified as a threshold question whether the 
subject matter of the regulation had a sufficient nexus to interstate 
commerce.35 In striking down the individual mandate, the Eleventh 
                                                                                                                      
29 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(I)–( J). The guaranteed issue and community rating 
reforms ensure that coverage is issued to and made affordable for high-risk individuals. 
Baker, supra note 2, at 1597. Because these reforms require private insurers to accept losses 
on insurance contracts issued to high-risk individuals, Congress imposed the mandate to 
increase the overall size of the health insurance risk pool. See id. at 1586. 
30 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(F), (I)–( J). 
31 Id. § 18091(a)(2)(H). Critics note, however, that the individual mandate and its pe-
nalty do not apply to groups that contribute significantly to the cost-shifting problem, in-
cluding undocumented aliens and those below the income tax filing threshold. See 26 
U.S.C.A. § 5000A(d)(3), (e)(1)–(2). In addition, Congress may have dampened the coer-
cive effect of the penalty by capping it at the average price of forgone coverage. See id. 
§ 5000A(c). Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit found these criticisms persuasive. See infra notes 
70–74 and accompanying text. 
32 651 F.3d at 545. 
33 648 F.3d at 1311–13. 
34 See, e.g., Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A Ju-
risdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 Duke L.J. 267, 331 (1993) (“To carry a law 
or power into execution in its most basic sense means to provide enforcement machinery, 
prescribe penalties, authorize the hiring of employees, [and] appropriate funds. . . . It 
does not mean to regulate unenumerated subject areas to make the exercise of enumer-
ated powers more efficient.”). 
35 648 F.3d at 1300–02. 
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Circuit held that Congress impermissibly relied on a “multi-step cost-
shifting scenario” associated with the uninsured that would require a 
court to pile inference upon inference to sustain an unprecedented 
exercise of legislative power.36 In contrast, the Sixth Circuit reasoned 
that individuals who self-insure37 undermine Congress’s efforts to stabi-
lize prices in the interstate health insurance market by satisfying their 
own demand for a commodity (i.e., health insurance) rather than re-
sorting to the market.38 
 Unlike the Sixth Circuit, the court in Florida declined to find that 
the individual mandate is essential to Congress’s larger economic regu-
lation of health insurance markets.39 According to the Eleventh Circuit, 
the “larger regulatory scheme” doctrine simply did not apply because 
Congress lacked the power to compel the purchase of health insur-
ance.40 The court reasoned that a blind application of the doctrine 
would amount to nothing more than a magic words test whereby Con-
gress’s finding that a regulation is essential to a comprehensive regula-
tory scheme would “immunize[] its enactment from constitutional in-
quiry.”41 Furthermore, the court found that the individual mandate was 
not, in fact, essential to Congress’s larger regulation of the health in-
surance industry, but was merely designed to counteract the significant 
regulatory costs resulting from the Act’s elimination of medical under-
                                                                                                                      
36 Id. at 1302; see also id. at 1298 (describing Congress’s inferential chain of reasoning). 
But see Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 24, at *22 (arguing that the “present pre-
miums others pay must cover the risk of the uninsured” because the “uninsured . . . exter-
nalize the cost of their present medical risk to others every day, not at some indeterminate 
future time”). 
37 The Sixth Circuit defined self-insurance as the practice whereby “individuals make 
an assessment of their own risk and to what extent they must set aside funds or arrange 
their affairs to compensate for probable future health care needs.” Thomas More, 651 F.3d 
at 543. The court reasoned, however, that the self-insured continue to externalize costs on 
other payers. See id. at 545 (noting that the “high cost of health care means that those who 
self-insure, as a class, are unable to pay for the health care services that they receive”); see 
also Brendan S. Maher, The Benefits of Opt-In Federalism, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 1733, 1741 (2011) 
(noting that “[i]ndividuals may lack the resources or training to appropriately plan for 
future needs”). 
38 Thomas More, 651 F.3d at 545; see also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 129 (1942) 
(observing that although a restriction on wheat consumption may have the effect of “forc-
ing some farmers into the market to buy what they could provide for themselves,” all regu-
lation “lays a restraining hand on the self-interest of the regulated” for the benefit of the 
community). 
39 648 F.3d at 1307. 
40 See id. at 1307–08 (reasoning that the larger regulatory scheme doctrine did not ap-
ply where the “entire class of activity is outside the reach of congressional power”). 
41 Id. at 1309. 
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writing.42 Such political considerations, the court explained, do not 
convert an unconstitutional regulation into an essential—and thereby 
constitutional—statutory fix.43 
II. The Propriety of an Economic Mandate as an Element of a 
Larger Regulation of Interstate Commerce 
A. The Consistent Judicial Interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause 
 Nearly 200 years ago, Chief Justice John Marshall noted that the 
Federal “[G]overnment is acknowledged by all to be one of enumer-
ated powers.”44 Nevertheless, in defining the scope of congressional 
power under Article I, Chief Justice Marshall held that a government of 
enumerated powers must be “entrusted with ample means for their ex-
ecution.”45 Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court endorsed a broad reading of 
the Necessary and Proper Clause, which “makes clear that the Constitu-
tion’s grants of specific federal legislative authority are accompanied by 
broad power to enact laws that are ‘convenient, or useful’ or ‘condu-
cive’ to the authority’s ‘beneficial exercise.’”46 Similarly, in 2010, in 
United States v. Comstock, the Supreme Court identified the relevant in-
quiry, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, as “simply ‘whether the 
means chosen are “reasonably adapted” to the attainment of a legiti-
mate end under the commerce power.’”47 
 Consequently, the Government has argued that even if the indi-
vidual mandate is not an independently valid exercise of legislative 
power under the Commerce Clause, it is valid in combination with the 
                                                                                                                      
42 Id. at 1310 (concluding that “an individual’s uninsured status in no way interferes with 
Congress’s ability to regulate insurance companies”). The Act’s insurance industry reforms 
eliminate medical underwriting, the process whereby insurers accept enrollees and set pre-
miums based on a prediction of future claims. See Susan Jaffe, Health Policy Brief: Health Insur-
ance Reforms 2, Health Affairs (Oct. 21, 2009), http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/ 
brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_12.pdf. 
43 Florida, 648 F.3d at 1310. 
44 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819). 
45 Id. at 408; accord United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 118–19 (1942) 
(holding that where Congress has the authority to enact a regulation of interstate com-
merce, “it possesses every power needed to make that regulation effective”). 
46 United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010) (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. 
at 413, 418); see also McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421 (“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within 
the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly 
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited . . . are constitutional.”). Thus, Chief Justice 
Marshall held that the word “necessary” does not mean absolutely necessary. See McCulloch, 
17 U.S. at 413–15. 
47 130 S. Ct. at 1957 (quoting Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 37 (2005) (Scalia, J., con-
curring)). 
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Necessary and Proper Clause as an appropriate means for carrying into 
execution Congress’s larger economic regulation of health insurance 
markets.48 Moreover, in Comstock, the Court held that the choice of 
means for carrying into execution an enumerated power is primarily 
left to the discretion of Congress.49 In its legislative findings, Congress 
concluded that without an individual mandate, the guaranteed issue 
and community rating reforms would create an incentive for individu-
als to forgo purchasing health insurance until they required care.50 
Thus, the Government contends that striking down the mandate would 
“leave a gaping hole” in the Act’s comprehensive scheme, leading to 
the eventual collapse of private health insurance markets.51 
 This argument prevailed in Thomas More, when the Sixth Circuit 
concluded that the individual mandate is essential to Congress’s larger 
regulation of health insurance markets.52 There, the court found that 
even if the act of self-insuring were not economic activity with a substan-
tial effect on interstate commerce, Congress could impose an individual 
mandate to maintain the integrity of its comprehensive scheme.53 
Moreover, the court held that Congress need only have a rational basis 
for concluding that failure to impose an individual mandate—along 
with its other insurance industry reforms—would undercut its overlying 
economic regulatory scheme.54 According to the court, Congress ra-
tionally concluded that leaving the self-insured outside federal control 
would undermine its efforts to broaden the risk pool.55 Therefore, the 
Sixth Circuit held that the Necessary and Proper Clause granted Con-
                                                                                                                      
48 See Brief for the United States, supra note 27, at 32, 43–44 (arguing that “Congress is 
not regulating inactivity as such, but as an aspect of its regulation of active participation in 
the health care market” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
49 Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1957; Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321, 355 
(1903) (holding that Congress has “a large discretion as to the means that may be em-
ployed in executing a given power”). 
50 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(I) (West Supp. 2011). 
51 See Brief for the United States, supra note 27, at 28. 
52 651 F.3d 529, 545–47 (6th Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3065 (U.S. July 
26, 2011) (No. 11-117). 
53 See id. at 545 (noting that the Supreme Court has held that Congress can regulate 
non-commercial intrastate activity if it concludes that it is necessary in order to regulate 
the interstate market (citing Raich, 545 U.S. at 18)). 
54 See id. at 545–47; see also id. at 557 (Sutton, J., concurring) (“The basic policy idea, 
for better or worse (and courts must assume better), is to compel individuals with the req-
uisite income to pay now rather than later for health care.”). 
55 See id. at 545–47. 
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gress the power to impose an individual mandate as an essential com-
ponent of its comprehensive scheme.56 
 Critics of the individual mandate, however, note that the Necessary 
and Proper Clause requires that federal statutes also employ “proper” or 
“appropriate” means to regulate interstate commerce.57 Thus, although 
the individual mandate may survive the deferential means-end test ap-
plied in Comstock, a court must also consider whether the regulation is 
consistent with the “letter and spirit of the constitution.”58 Otherwise, as 
the Eleventh Circuit warned, application of the larger regulatory scheme 
doctrine may permit Congress to assume a general police power.59 
B. The Eleventh Circuit Challenges the Necessity and Propriety  
of the Individual Mandate 
 Although the Government’s argument prevailed in Thomas More, 
in Florida, the Eleventh Circuit noted the individual mandate’s “far-
reaching implications for our federalist structure.”60 According to the 
court, the Constitution must not be construed to grant to Congress a 
general police power traditionally reserved to the states.61 Moreover, 
the court noted, the individual mandate is an unprecedented exercise 
of federal legislative power because it seeks to regulate those who have 
not entered the stream of commerce by forcing market entry.62 There-
fore, the court found that although the mandate is an “expedient solu-
tion to pressing public needs,” it nevertheless lacks judicially enforce-
able limits and thus threatens our dual system of government.63 
                                                                                                                      
56 See id.; see also id. at 564 (Sutton, J., concurring) (noting that “courts do not apply 
strict scrutiny to commerce clause legislation and require only an appropriate or reason-
able fit between means and ends” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Comstock, 130 
S. Ct. at 1956–57)). 
57 Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health Insurance Man-
date Is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 581, 621 (2010) (citing McCulloch, 17 U.S. 
at 421). 
58 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421; see also Lawson & Granger, supra note 34, at 271 (stating 
that the clause safeguards unenumerated individual rights by requiring “executory laws to 
be both necessary and proper” (footnote omitted)). 
59 Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1309 (11th Cir. 
2011), cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3297 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2011) (No. 11-398). 
60 Id. at 1282. 
61 Id. at 1284 (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000)). 
62 See id. at 1291–92. But see Thomas More, 651 F.3d at 559–60 (Sutton, J., concurring) 
(stating that “[l]egislative novelty typically is not a constitutional virtue,” but that the “sub-
stantial-effects doctrine invites, rather than discourages, unconventional laws, making it 
difficult to draw conclusions from a legislative effort to shoehorn a new policy initiative 
into such a capacious theory of federal power”). 
63 Florida, 648 F.3d at 1312–13. 
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 Thus, in applying federalist principles as a substantive check on 
the Necessary and Proper Clause, the court noted that the structural 
limits imposed by federalism were designed to safeguard individual lib-
erty.64 Although eschewing formalistic distinctions, the court found 
that empowering Congress to mandate the purchase of health insur-
ance from private corporations would impermissibly confer a general 
police power on the federal government.65 Therefore, the court con-
cluded that even if the individual mandate is essential to avoid the ad-
verse selection phenomenon engendered by Congress’s overlying eco-
nomic regulatory scheme, Congress may not properly exercise this 
ow
ss’s delegated powers and thus im-
op
date and its penalty71 undercut Congress’s efforts to cure the adverse 
                                                                                                                     
p er.66 
 The Eleventh Circuit, however, did not directly address whether 
the Tenth Amendment’s reservation of residual power “to the people” 
is an independent substantive limit on congressional power.67 Rather, 
the court noted that laws regulating the health of citizens fall within a 
zone of traditional state concern.68 Accordingly, the individual man-
date is beyond the scope of Congre
pr erly regulates individual behavior.69 
 Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit challenged Congress’s finding 
that the mandate is, in fact, essential to its comprehensive scheme.70 Ac-
cording to the court, the numerous exemptions to the individual man-
 
inactive, but rather for some inchoate reason stated at the highest order of 
abst
the results of the statute are, 
the x would be”). 
lementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Be-
yond
ngthens the inference that the individual mandate 
exc undaries.”). 
 
64 See id. at 1284. 
65 See id. at 1312–13; see also id. at 1351 n.14 (Marcus, J., dissenting) (stating that the 
majority “suggest[s] that the individual mandate is a ‘bridge too far’ . . . not because it 
conscripts the 
raction”). 
66 See id. at 1309–10; see also Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1297 (N.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 648 F.3d 1235 
(11th Cir. 2011) (noting that the Government’s proposed application of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause would “enabl[e] Congress to pass ill-conceived, or economically disruptive 
statutes, secure in the knowledge that the more dysfunctional 
more essential or ‘necessary’ the statutory fi
67 See Florida, 648 F.3d at 1303, 1313 n.129. 
68 Id. at 1305. For a thorough and nuanced analysis of how the Affordable Care Act is 
both federalism-respecting and boundary-shifting, see Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federal-
ism and Statutory Interpretation: State Imp
, 121 Yale L.J. 534, 582–94 (2011). 
69 See id. at 1306 (“Congress’s encroachment upon these areas of traditional state con-
cern is yet another factor that . . . stre
eeds constitutional bo
70 See id. at 1309–11. 
71 Several groups are not required to obtain minimum essential coverage. E.g., 26 
U.S.C.A. § 5000A(d)(2)(A) (West 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2014) (religious objectors); id. 
§ 5000A(d)(2)(B) (health care sharing ministry members); id. § 5000A(d)(3) (undocu-
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selection and cost-shifting problems.72 In Addition, the court concluded 
that healthy individuals may opt to pay the relatively modest penalty and 
purchase insurance only when they get sick.73 Therefore, the court 
claimed, Congress included a gaping hole in its own regulatory scheme, 
rendering the mandate unnecessary to its larger reform effort.74 
III. The End of Rational Basis Review?: The Eleventh  
Circuit Revisits the Factual Foundation for  
the Individual Mandate 
 In Florida, the Eleventh Circuit struck down the individual mandate 
in an effort to enforce the outer limits of congressional power.75 The 
court declined to endorse the Government’s argument that the individ-
ual mandate is a necessary and proper exercise of legislative power.76 
Moreover, it rejected Congress’s finding that the unique qualities of the 
health care market rendered the mandate an appropriate means to 
maintain the integrity of its overlying economic regulatory scheme.77 
Additionally, although it claimed to apply a presumption of constitu-
tionality to an act of Congress, the Eleventh Circuit failed to identify 
administrable standards to assess the propriety of economic mandates.78 
 Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit embarked on an exacting review 
of Congress’s underlying policy judgments.79 For example, the court set 
aside Congress’s finding that the individual mandate is essential to im-
                                                                                                                      
mented aliens); id. § 5000A(d)(4) (prisoners). In addition, Congress exempted groups 
from the penalty. E.g., id. § 5000A(e)(1) (individuals who cannot afford coverage); id. 
§ 5000A(e)(2) (incomes below the tax filing threshold). 
72 See Florida, 648 F.3d at 1310–11. 
73 Id. at 1311. 
74 Id. (stating that “to the extent the uninsureds’ ability to delay insurance purchases 
would leave a gaping hole in Congress’s efforts to reform the insurance market, Congress 
has seen fit to bore the hole itself”). 
75 See Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1311–13 (11th Cir. 
2011), cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3297 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2011) (No. 11-398) (discussing the need 
for judicially enforceable limits on Congress’s enumerated powers); see also United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995) (noting that “Congress has operated within this framework 
of legal uncertainty ever since this Court determined that it was the Judiciary’s duty to ‘say 
what the law is’” (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803))); John C. 
Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1311, 1404 (1997) (noting that “an 
absence of judicial review . . . over federalism questions would abort the Framers’ design”). 
76 See Florida, 648 F.3d at 1307. 
77 See id. at 1295–97. 
78 See id. at 1284. 
79 See id. at 1281–82, 1298–1300. 
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plementing the Act’s guaranteed issue and community rating reforms.80 
The court found that the individual mandate would, in fact, fail to solve 
the adverse selection problem because healthy individuals would choose 
to pay the penalty rather than enter the health insurance market.81 
Based on these independent findings, the court then concluded that 
the mandate was actually intended to compensate insurance companies 
for the regulatory costs imposed by Congress’s larger regulatory 
scheme.82 
 Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in Florida under-
mines Congress’s ability to balance competing economic and political 
interests in the legislative process.83 In setting aside Congress’s policy 
judgment that the individual mandate is essential to its larger regulation 
of health insurance markets, the court abandoned rational basis review.84 
The court noted that it was improper for Congress to mandate the pur-
chase of health insurance based solely on the congressional finding that 
the integrity of the larger regulatory scheme depended on forcing con-
sumers into a market.85 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the view that 
Congress is the primary arbiter of what is necessary and proper.86 
 Finally, the Eleventh Circuit’s heightened standard of review, if 
adopted by the Supreme Court, may raise significant obstacles to Con-
gress’s future efforts to set social welfare policy.87 Solutions to collective 
                                                                                                                      
 
80 See id. at 1298–1300, 1309–10; see also id. at 1354–55 (Marcus, J., dissenting) (admon-
ishing the majority for scrutinizing Congress’s underlying policy judgments and factual 
determinations). 
81 Id. at 1310–11. 
82 See Florida, 648 F.3d at 1310. 
83 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 607 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that the “adoption of ra-
tional basis review expressed the recognition that the Court had no sustainable basis for 
subjecting economic regulation . . . to judicial policy judgments”). 
84 See Florida, 648 F.3d at 1343–44 (Marcus, J., dissenting) (noting that “the majority’s 
searching inquiry . . . into whether the individual mandate fully solves the problems Con-
gress aimed to solve, or whether there may have been more efficacious ways to do so, 
probes far beyond the proper scope of a court’s Commerce Clause review”); Thomas More 
Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 564 (6th Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3065 
(U.S. July 26, 2011) (No. 11-117) (Sutton, J., concurring) (noting that “[t]he courts do not 
apply strict scrutiny to commerce clause legislation and require only an appropriate or 
reasonable fit between means and ends” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
85 See Florida, 648 F.3d at 1299–1300, 1309. 
86 See id. at 1313; see also Lawson & Granger, supra note 34, at 276 (arguing that the Ne-
cessary and Proper Clause “sets forth an objective standard by which the necessity and 
propriety of laws can and must be determined, and it gives no indication that Congress is 
the only entity authorized to make that determination”). 
87 See Florida, 648 F.3d at 1345 (Marcus, J., dissenting) (“Every new proposal is in some 
way unprecedented before it is tried. And to draw the line against any new congressional 
enactment simply because of its novelty ignores the lessons found in the Supreme Court’s 
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action problems may well depend on the development and implemen-
tation of novel regulatory schemes that include the use of economic 
mandates.88 Thus, courts may also consider that the political process, 
rather than rigorous judicial enforcement of federalism principles, will 
vindicate individual liberty by shielding the people from unreasonable 
economic mandates.89 
Conclusion 
 The U.S. Supreme Court has granted review of the Eleventh Cir-
cuit’s decision in Florida. Although the Court’s resolution of the case will 
allow the Justices to expound on doctrinal federalism questions, the fate 
of the individual mandate will have a profound impact on the develop-
ment of social welfare policy over the next several decades. As Congress 
undertakes necessary reforms to entitlement programs, vigorous judicial 
oversight of economic regulation could chill legislative innovation. 
 Therefore, in addition to addressing the application of the larger 
regulatory scheme doctrine to Commerce Clause challenges, the Court 
should more clearly define the judiciary’s role as the guardian of our 
federalist system. If the Court opts to impose federalism-based limits on 
the Necessary and Proper Clause, then it must identify administrable 
standards to ensure appropriate deference to the judgment and exper-
tise of the political branches. Finally, if the Court affirms the Eleventh 
Circuit, it must reconcile the Eleventh Circuit’s exacting review of Con-
                                                                                                                      
Commerce Clause cases.”); Thomas More, 651 F.3d at 560 (Sutton, J., concurring) (“The 
substantial-effects doctrine invites, rather than discourages, unconventional laws, making it 
difficult to draw conclusions from a legislative effort to shoehorn a new policy initiative 
into such a capacious theory of federal power.”); see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819) (describing the Constitution as a document “intended to endure 
for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs”). 
88 See Thomas More, 651 F.3d at 560 (Sutton, J., concurring) (stating that the individual 
mandate may offer yet another example of a “policy necessity giving birth to an inventive 
(and constitutional) congressional solution”); see also Neil S. Siegel, Free Riding on Benevolence: 
Collective Action Federalism and the Minimum Coverage Provision, 75 Law & Contemp. Probs. 
(forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 5), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1843228 (stating that “constitutional authorization to issue economic mandates 
extends to situations in which ‘inactive’ individuals free ride off the contributions of others”). 
89 See Thomas More, 651 F.3d at 566 (Sutton, J., concurring) (“Time assuredly will bring 
to light the policy strengths and weaknesses of using the individual mandate as part of this 
national legislation, allowing the peoples’ political representatives, rather than their 
judges, to have the primary say over its utility.”); see also The Federalist No. 44, at 286 
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“[I]n the last resort a remedy must be ob-
tained from the people, who can, by the election of more faithful representatives, annul 
the acts of the usurpers.”). 
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gress’s regulatory decision making with the presumption of constitu-
tionality and rational basis review traditionally applied in such cases. 
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